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Does a low market valuation make a firm a takeover target? In theory, acquirers can profit from
taking over a firm, whose market value is low relative to its peers, and restore it to its potential.
Indeed, in practice, acquirers and other investors track a firm’s valuation multiples for indication
on the potential for acquisition, and managers strive to maintain high market valuation to prevent
a hostile takeover. Understanding whether such a link exists is important because, if so, it suggests
that the market provides a powerful disciplining device to alleviate managerial agency problems
(see Marris (1964), Manne (1965) and Jensen (1993)). Empirical studies on takeovers, however,
fail to systematically uncover a meaningful relationship between market valuations and takeover
probabilities. While Cremers, Nair, and John (2009) and Bates, Becher, and Lemmon (2008) find
a negative, but economically insignificant, relation between takeover likelihood and Tobin’s Q,
Palepu (1986) and Ambrose and Megginson (1992) uncover no link, and Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson,
and Viswanathan (2005) document that target market-to-book ratios are in fact higher than in
control firms. Relatedly, Agrawal and Jaﬀe (2003) find that targets do not exhibit inferior prior
stock performance than peer firms.
We argue that there is a fundamental challenge in finding a relation between market prices
and takeover activity in the data, because the relationship is inherently bi-directional. While
markets may exhibit a trigger eﬀect, in which a low valuation induces a takeover attempt, there is
also an anticipation eﬀect, in which forward-looking market prices are inflated by the probability
of a future takeover. Estimating the underlying trigger eﬀect must account for the anticipation
eﬀect. Even if a low valuation attracts an acquisition, a high valuation may indicate that the
market believes an acquisition is probable, thus attenuating any relationship between valuation
and takeover probability found in the data. In this paper, we attempt to identify these two eﬀects
separately. We call the combination of these eﬀects the feedback loop.
Disentangling the trigger eﬀect from the anticipation eﬀect requires an instrumental variable: a
variable that directly aﬀects the market price, but aﬀects takeover probability only via its eﬀect on
the market price. Conceptually, this is a diﬃcult problem: any variable that is directly associated
with the firm’s characteristics or its management would not qualify as an instrument since it is
directly related to both the price and the probability of a takeover. Hence we seek a variable
that causes mispricing, i.e., one that changes the price, but not due to issues related to the firm’s
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fundamentals.
Friction-driven mispricing events have been the subject of a large recent literature in finance,
summarized by Duﬃe (2010) in his presidential address to the American Finance Association.
Building on this literature, we construct a measure of price pressure induced by mutual funds not
due to informational reasons, but due to flows they face from investors. The idea follows from
Coval and Staﬀord (2007), who document that large flows by mutual fund investors lead prices of
stocks held by the funds to shift away from fundamental value for prolonged periods of time. While
Coval and Staﬀord (2007) investigate actual trades executed by mutual funds, this is not a valid
instrument in our context as funds may be trading deliberately based on private information on a
firm’s likely takeover potential. We instead study mutual funds’ hypothetical trades mechanically
induced by flows by their own investors. We argue that fund investors’ decisions to accumulate
or divest mutual fund shares are unlikely to be directly correlated with the takeover prospects of
individual firms held by the fund. An investor, who wishes to speculate on the takeover likelihood
of an individual firm, will trade the stock of that firm, rather than a mutual fund share.1 Hence,
investor flows lead to price pressure that may aﬀect the probability of a takeover, but are not
directly related to this probability. We find that our measure causes significant price changes,
followed by slow reversal that ends with full correction only after two years on average. Using this
as an instrument for the market price, we are able to find a strong negative relation between market
prices and takeover probabilities.
Prior literature studies the eﬀect of raw valuations (such as price-to-earnings or market-to-book
ratios) on takeover likelihood. However, a low raw valuation may not indicate underperformance
and thus the need for a corrective action, as it may be driven by irremediably low quality — for
example, because the firm is mature and in a competitive industry. We thus construct a “discount”
measure of the diﬀerence between a firm’s current valuation and its potential value under full
eﬃciency. This discount measures the value that an acquirer can create by restoring a firm to
its potential, and thus has a theoretical link to the likelihood that a firm becomes targeted by a
bidder. We estimate the potential value using the values of other firms in the industry or with
similar basic fundamentals. Without accounting for the fact that prices reflect takeover likelihood,
1 Importantly, we exclude mutual funds that concentrate on a specific industry to assure that investors’ flows are
not driven by a takeover wave among many firms held by the fund.
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an inter-quartile change in the discount is associated with a 1 percentage point increase in takeover
probability. Our main contribution is in showing that, by accounting for the anticipation eﬀect by
instrumenting the discount with mutual fund investors’ flows, the trigger eﬀect rises substantially
to 7 percentage points. This is both statistically significant and economically important compared
to the 62% unconditional probability that a given firm receives a takeover bid in a particular year.
Using this analysis, we can also estimate the magnitude of the anticipation eﬀect. An inter-quartile
change in shocks to takeover probability is associated with a 39 percentage point decrease in the
discount on average, versus a mean discount of 18− 28%.
These findings have a number of implications for takeover markets. First and foremost, the
trigger eﬀect implies that financial markets are not just a side show. They have a real eﬀect on
corporate events, such as takeovers, and thus on firm value. In that, our paper adds to existing
evidence on the real eﬀect of financial markets, such as Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) and Chen,
Goldstein, and Jiang (2007).2 While these previous papers identified the real eﬀect via comparative
statics (showing that the sensitivity of real decisions to prices increases in some firm characteristic
that is hypothesized to augment the importance of prices), our paper identifies it directly. It is the
first to use an instrumental variable to capture the eﬀect of exogenous price changes on corporate
events.
There are a number of reasons for why market prices may have real eﬀects. First, decision
makers may learn from market prices to guide their actions — see, for example, the models of
Fishman and Hagerty (1992), Dow and Gorton (1997), and Goldstein and Guembel (2008). In a
takeover context, the argument is more intricate. For prices to aﬀect takeover likelihood (rather
than just the price paid in a takeover), there must be an asymmetry in learning between the acquirer
and the target’s shareholders. For example, suppose that target shareholders learn the firm’s true
value from the market price and thus demand a takeover price that is closely linked to the market
price (e.g. a certain premium above market price),3 but the acquirer has additional information on
the potential value that can be achieved under his management and so the value of the target to him
is less sensitive to the market price. Then, a decrease in target valuation will increase the potential
2For an early discussion, see Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990).
3Schwert (1996) provides related evidence, finding that the oﬀer price increases almost dollar-for-dollar with the
target’s pre-bid runup. He argues that the higher oﬀer price may be justified by the target’s greater perceived value
based on new information from the runup. He does not explore the eﬀect on takeover probability.
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gain for the acquirer and thus the likelihood of a bid. Note that the possibility of asymmetric
learning has not been incorporated yet into the theoretical takeover literature. Our empirical
findings thus call for modification of existing takeover theories. Second, market participants may
anchor on the price, as in Baker, Pan, and Wurgler (2009). For example, practitioners currently
study premia to the market price in related past deals to estimate an appropriate premium to oﬀer
in the current transaction (known as “precedent transactions analysis”).
Interestingly, the active role of financial markets implies that any factor that influences prices
can also influence takeover activity (and other real actions). Therefore, mispricing (e.g. due to
market frictions or investor errors) can have real consequences by impacting takeovers. Hence, our
paper is related to the behavioral corporate finance literature (surveyed by Baker, Ruback, and
Wurgler (2007)). In particular, Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006) use a firm’s multiple
as an indicator for mispricing and link it to takeover activity. Unlike us, they do not model the
relationship between prices and takeovers as a simultaneous system or use an instrumental variable
to identify the eﬀect of exogenous price changes, but instead focus on the equilibrium correlation
between the multiples and takeovers. Note that, in the behavioral corporate finance literature,
temporary overvaluation often improves a firm’s fundamental value as it allows managers to raise
capital or undertake acquisitions at favorable prices (e.g. Stein (1996), Shleifer and Vishny (2003)).
Here, it can reduce fundamental value by deterring value-creating takeovers.
Second, regarding the anticipation eﬀect, our results demonstrate the illusory content of stock
prices. While researchers typically use valuation measures to proxy for management performance,
a firm’s stock price may not reveal the full extent of its agency problems, as it may also incorporate
the expected correction of these problems via a takeover. Our results thus challenge the common
practice of using Tobin’s or stock price performance to measure management quality. By breaking
the correlation between market valuations and takeover activity into trigger and anticipation eﬀects,
our analysis enables us to ascertain the extent to which future expected takeovers are priced in. In
that, our paper is related to Song and Walkling (2000), who find an increase in firms’ stock prices
following the acquisition of their rivals and attribute this to the increased expectation that they
will be taken over themselves. Other papers have analyzed the eﬀect of takeover anticipation on
stock returns rather than valuations. Hackbarth and Morellec (2008) and Cremers, Nair, and John
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(2009) show that anticipated takeovers aﬀect the correlation of a stock’s return with the market
return and hence have an eﬀect on the discount rate. Prabhala (1997) and Li and Prabhala (2007)
note that takeover anticipation will aﬀect the market return to merger announcements.
Third, considering the full feedback loop, our results suggest that the anticipation eﬀect might be
an impediment to takeovers — the anticipation of a takeover boosts prices, deterring the acquisition
of underperforming firms. Moreover, it may also allow managers to underperform in the first
place since they are less fearful of disciplinary acquisitions.4 Indeed, many practitioners believe
that the anticipation eﬀect has significant eﬀects on real-life takeover activity. A December 22,
2005 Wall Street Journal article claims that this has been a major problem in the U.S. banking
industry: “takeover potential raises [the] value of small financial institutions, making them harder
to acquire.” This may have had severe consequences, as small banks remained stand-alone and
were less able to withstand the recent financial crisis. Many commentators believe that the same
phenomenon recently occurred in the U.K. water industry. For example, an October 13, 2006
article in This Is Money notes that “there are concerns that the race for control of [water] assets has
overheated valuations, adding to speculation that the [merger] bubble is about to burst.” Essentially,
in these cases and others, the belief of an upcoming takeover becomes self-defeating. This eﬀect
is reminiscent of the free-rider problem in the theoretical model of Grossman and Hart (1980),
although the market price plays no role in coordinating expectations in their setting. Equilibrium
outcomes in settings where the combination of the trigger eﬀect and anticipation eﬀect becomes
self-defeating have been analyzed by Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott (2010).
This self-defeating nature of takeover expectations sheds new light on other important real-
world phenomena. First, it suggests why merger waves endogenously die out. If a recent spate of
mergers leads the market to predict future acquisitions, this causes valuations to rise (anticipation
eﬀect), dissuading further acquisition attempts. Second, it provides a rationale for the practice of
CEOs publicly expressing concerns about an upcoming takeover. Such statements act as a takeover
defense, as they inflate the price, which in turn deters the takeover from occurring.
In addition, our paper has a number of wider implications outside the takeover market. The
4Brealey, Myers, and Allen (2008) note that “the most important eﬀect of acquisitions may be felt by the managers
of companies that are not taken over. Perhaps the threat of takeover spurs the whole of corporate America to try
harder.”
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feedback loop may apply to other corrective actions, such as CEO replacement, shareholder activism
and regulatory intervention. Low valuations trigger intervention, but market anticipation causes
prices to rise, which in turn may deter the correction from occurring. Bradley, Brav, Goldstein,
and Jiang (2010) show that the discount at which a closed-end fund is traded aﬀects and reflects
the probability of activism at the same time. Separately, while many existing papers use raw
valuation or profitability to measure management quality or agency problems, this paper’s approach
of measuring them using a discount to potential value and purging them of anticipation can be
applied to a range of other settings.
More broadly, our results contribute to the growing literature that analyzes the link between
financial markets and corporate events. While corporate finance typically studies the eﬀect of
prices on firm actions and asset pricing examines the reverse relation, our paper analyzes the full
feedback loop — the simultaneous, two-way interaction between prices and corporate actions that
combines the trigger and anticipation eﬀects. One important strand of this literature concerns the
link between financial market eﬃciency and real eﬃciency. While most existing research suggests
that the former is beneficial for the latter5, our results point to an intriguing disadvantage of
forward-looking prices — they may deter the very actions that they anticipate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 specifies the model that we use
for the empirical analysis. In Section 2, we describe our data and variable construction. Section 3
presents the empirical results on the feedback loop. In Section 4, we consider some extensions and
robustness tests. Section 5 concludes.
1 Model Specification
1.1 Firm Valuation and Discount
A number of earlier papers have studied the eﬀect of raw valuations on takeover probability. By
contrast, our key explanatory variable is the “discount” at which a firm trades relative to its
maximum potential value absent managerial ineﬃciency and mispricing, which we call the “frontier
value”. Theoretically, it is this variable that will drive a firm’s likelihood of becoming a takeover
5See, e.g., Fishman and Hagerty (1992), Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999), Dow,
Goldstein, and Guembel (2008), Admati and Pfleiderer (2009), and Edmans (2009).
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target, as it measures the potential gain from an acquisition.
Under some circumstances, the frontier value is well-defined. For example, in closed-end funds, it
is the net asset value (NAV). The discount can then be simply calculated as the diﬀerence between
the NAV and the market price. Indeed, Bradley, Brav, Goldstein, and Jiang (2010) find that
activist shareholders are more likely to target closed-end funds that are trading at deep discounts.
Analogously, the market value of regular corporations can deviate from their potential value owing
to agency problems and/or mispricing, and this might make the corporation a takeover target.
For a regular corporation, the frontier value cannot be observed and must be estimated. This
is done by observing the valuation of “successful” firms with similar fundamentals. Specifically,
let  be a vector of variables that represent firm fundamentals that determine potential value:
 ∗ = (). Since  ∗ represents the potential value after the acquirer has corrected managerial
ineﬃciencies, the  variables should consist of firm characteristics that bidders are unlikely to
change upon takeover.
If the set of value-relevant variables  is exhaustive, and if there is no noise or mispricing in
valuation, then the maximum valuation commanded among the group of peer firms that share the
same fundamentals can be perceived as the “potential” of all other firms. However, a particular
firm could have an abnormally high valuation owing to luck, misvaluation, or idiosyncratic features
(such as unique core competencies) if  is not fully exhaustive of all value-relevant fundamental
variables. For example, a rival search engine is unlikely to command the valuation of Google even
if it is eﬃciently run. Therefore, setting the potential value to the maximum value among peers
would erroneously assume that this high valuation was achievable for all firms, and overestimate
the discount.
An improved specification is to set the potential value to a high-percentile, rather than the
maximum, valuation of peer firms. We define “successful” firms as those that command valuations
at the (1− )th percentile or higher among peer firms, where 0    12 . A firm valued at below
the (1− )th percentile is thus classified as operating below potential value. When  = 0, the
benchmark is the maximum valuation among peers; when  = 12 , the benchmark becomes the
median (we require   12 to reflect the fact that a successful firm should be above median).
We now discuss the choices for  variables and the parameter , starting with the former. In
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our first approach,  includes only a firm’s industry aﬃliation. Acquirers are unlikely to change
the target’s sector and instead typically aim to restore its value to that commanded by successful
firms in the same sector, so the industry aﬃliation easily satisfies the requirement for a valid 
variable. In using the industry benchmark, we follow other papers in the takeover literature (see,
e.g., Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005)) as well as practitioners. For example,
“comparable companies analysis” compares a firm’s valuation to its industry peers, and is often used
by practitioners to identify undervalued companies that might be suitable takeover targets. The
potential concern is that an industry benchmark ignores other determinants of the potential value.
For example, small and growing firms are likely to command higher valuations than larger, mature
peers. Also, this approach implicitly assumes that a particular industry cannot be systematically
over- or undervalued, contrary to evidence (Hoberg and Phillips (2010)).
We therefore also employ a second approach, using firm characteristics as  variables.6 We take
two steps to reduce the concern that the estimated frontier value can be aﬀected by the acquirer.
First, following Habib and Ljungqvist (2005), who also estimate a frontier value, we choose variables
that are unlikely to be radically transformed by an acquirer. For example, both a firm’s market
share and financial policies (such as dividend payout) aﬀect its actual valuation. However, only
the former aﬀects its frontier valuation: it is diﬃcult to transform market share immediately,
but financial policies can be quickly reversed. The  variables we use are firm size, firm age,
asset intensity, R&D intensity, market share, growth opportunities, and business cyclicality. These
variables are further motivated in Section 2.2 as well as in Habib and Ljungqvist (2005).
Second, we recognize that firm characteristics are not completely exogenous and that acquirers
may be able to change them within a modest range. We therefore do not use the raw measures of
these variables (except for age, which is fully exogenous) but their tercile ranks. This specification
allows for bidders to change the value of these fundamentals within a given tercile, but not to alter
it suﬃciently to move it into a diﬀerent tercile. Since an acquirer may be able to change the tercile
of a firm that is currently close to the cutoﬀs, we exclude such firms from a sensitivity analysis in
Section 4.
Indeed, existing research finds that takeover gains typically stem from correcting underperfor-
6We do not use industry aﬃliation in conjunction with firm characteristics, as we wish to allow particular industries
to be over- or undervalued.
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mance given a set of fundamentals, rather than changing the fundamentals themselves. For the
typical M&A deal, one cannot observe whether the target’s fundamentals change since they are
consolidated with the acquirer, but this is possible in LBOs since the target continues to be reported
independently. Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) find that the sales (one of our  variables) of
LBO targets change at a similar rate to non-targets, and Smith (1990) documents no significant
diﬀerence in the rate of change in R&D (a second  variable). Relatedly, many papers find that the
bulk of value creation from LBOs is due to improvements in eﬃciency. This literature is surveyed by
Eckbo and Thorburn (2008); we briefly mention the key papers here. Kaplan (1989), Smith (1990),
and Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) find improvements in accounting performance; Smith (1990)
show that these arise from superior working capital management and Muscarella and Vetsuypens
(1990) demonstrate that they stem from cutting expenses rather than increasing revenues. Using
plant-level data, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) document significant increases in productivity; the
case study of Baker and Wruck (1989) finds improved incentives, monitoring and working capital
management.
In summary, there is a trade-oﬀ between the two approaches. The advantage of the second
approach is that a more extensive list of variables will provide a more accurate assessment of the
true potential value. The disadvantage is that some of the added variables may not be completely
outside the acquirer’s control. This concern does not arise under the first approach, where the only
 variable is the industry aﬃliation. As we describe later, our results turn out to be slightly
stronger under the industry approach.
The remaining specification issue is the choice of . Here, again, there is a trade-oﬀ. A low
 may overweight abnormal observations; a high  may underestimate the potential value and
thus the occurrence of discounts. We calibrate  from the empirical facts documented by prior
literature. According to Andrade, Mitchell, and Staﬀord (2001), the median takeover premium
was 37 − 39 percent during the 1980-2002 period; Jensen and Ruback (1983) documented similar
magnitudes in an earlier period. Since bidder returns are close to zero on average (Jensen and
Ruback (1983), Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008)), the target captures almost the entire value
gains from the takeover. Therefore, on average, the takeover premium represents the potential for
value improvement at the target. We thus calibrate the (1 − )th percentile (i.e. the expected
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post-takeover value) to capture the value of the median target firm (pre-takeover) plus the median
takeover premium (38%).7 Specifically, we pool all firms within a given SIC three-digit industry
across all years and subtract year fixed eﬀects. We then add 38% to the pre-acquisition equity
value of each firm that was a takeover target and rank each target’s cum-premium value within its
industry peers. We find that, after including the premium, the median ranking of targets in our
sample is at the 77th percentile of the respective industry. Rounding to the nearest decile, this
corresponds to an  of 20%. In other words, about 80% (20%) of the firms are traded at a discount
(premium) in a given year. This choice of  is also supported by evidence from closed-end funds,
a setting in which the discount can be precisely measured. Bradley, Brav, Goldstein, and Jiang
(2010) find that, on average, about 20% (80%) of closed-end funds trade at a premium (discount)
to NAV. In Section 4, we vary  across the range of [010 030], and find that our results are not
sensitive to the choice of  within this region.
Once  and  are chosen, and given observed valuations  , the potential value can be estimated
using the quantile regression method pioneered by Koenker and Bassett (1978):
 =  + , where 1−() = 0 (1)
 is a disturbance term, and  is the potential value. More specifically, with actual data
{}, and for a given , we estimate b in (1) via the least absolute deviation (LAD) method:
minb∈B
1

⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
X
(;b)
(1− )
¯¯¯
 − (; b)¯¯¯+ X
≤(;b)

¯¯¯
 − (; b)¯¯¯
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
 (2)
(; b) ≥ 0
where (; b) is the estimated maximum potential value. Note that (2) holds regardless of the
distribution of  (or its empirical analog −(; b)), and so we do not require any assumptions
for the disturbance term, except for its value at the (1−)th percentile. The added non-negativity
7Arguably, the takeover premium might include synergy as well as eﬃciency gains. According to Betton, Eckbo,
and Thorburn (2008), same-industry takeovers (where synergies are most likely) do not involve higher takeover
premia; and hostile takeovers (which are less likely to be synergy-driven) do not feature lower premia. Therefore,
valuation-driven takeovers likely exhibit similar premia to takeovers in general.
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constraint (; b) ≥ 0 (which reflects limited liability) is a minor variation to the original model
of Koenker and Bassett (1978). It is addressed by the censored least absolute deviation (CLAD)
method of Powell (1984). Obviously, this estimation is simple under the first approach where there
is a single  variable, the industry aﬃliation. In this case, the frontier value is simply the 80th
percentile firm in the industry.
Having estimated b, the empirical analog to  = ( ∗ −  )  ∗ is
³
b − ´ b (3)
Our estimation of the potential value is a form of the stochastic frontier method proposed by
Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977), analyzed by Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). A diﬀerent form of
stochastic frontier analysis has been used in finance by Hunt-McCool, Koh, and Francis (1996) and
Habib and Ljungqvist (2005). Our specification (1) makes no parametric assumptions regarding
 and thus accommodates skewness, heteroskedasticity and within-cluster correlation, all of which
are common features in finance panel data.
Note that our discount measure provides a “floor” estimate for the potential increase in value
due to a takeover. This is because it captures the discount in the valuation of the firm as a
standalone entity relative to its peers, and deliberately does not take into account any synergies
with specific acquirers. This is because our goal is to study the eﬀect of prices on takeover activity,
and more generally the importance of financial markets for real decisions. If synergies are the
primary motive for mergers and/or financial markets are a side show, our  measure (which
ignores acquirer-specific synergies and captures only managerial ineﬃciency and mispricing) should
have no explanatory power. By contrast, we find that standalone  does attract takeovers.8
1.2 Interaction of Takeover and Discount
Our goal is to estimate the bi-directional relationship between takeover likelihood and value dis-
counts. We will show that accounting for the anticipation eﬀect (from the takeover likelihood to the
8Note that, to the extent that other peer firms have already merged and achieved synergies, our measure does
capture these potential synergies. The synergies that our measure does not capture are those that are not reflected
in the current value of comparable firms and are specific to a combination with a particular acquirer.
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discount) is crucial in quantifying the trigger eﬀect (from the discount to the takeover likelihood).
For illustrative purposes, we start with a benchmark model without the anticipation eﬀect, i.e.,
where market valuations do not incorporate the possibility of future takeovers. We use 0
to denote the “underlying” discount that would exist in such a world. In this benchmark model,
the system can be written as:
0 = 0 + 11 + 22 +  (4)
∗ = 10 + 2 + 31 +  (5)
 =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1, if ∗  0
0, otherwise,
(6)
( ) = 0 (7)
∗ is the latent variable for the propensity of a takeover bid, and  is the cor-
responding observed binary outcome. Since ( ) = 0, the two equations can be separately
estimated using a linear regression model and a binary response regression model, respectively.
We classify determinants of the discount into two groups. 1 is a vector of variables that aﬀect
both the discount and the probability of takeovers. These include variables that capture managerial
agency problems, as they aﬀect operational ineﬃciency and are likely also correlated with takeover
resistance. 2 is a variable that represents market frictions that aﬀect the stock price, but have no
independent eﬀect on takeover probability other than through the price. The distinction between
1 and 2 variables will become important when we incorporate the anticipation eﬀect and require
instruments.
Since the discount is calculated using tercile ranks of  (except  which enters with its full
value), it is not orthogonal to the raw values of  and so  (except ) appears in (4). We also
allow the  variables to enter the  equation directly as certain firm characteristics may
make an acquisition easier to execute. For example, small acquisitions are easier to finance and less
likely to violate antitrust hurdles (Palepu (1986) and Mikkelson and Partch (1989)). In addition,
it is easier to raise debt to finance targets with steady cash flows, high asset tangibility and in
non-cyclical businesses. All variables are described in Section 2.2.
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Allowing for the anticipation eﬀect, the equations above become interdependent. Specifically, if
the market rationally anticipates the probability of a takeover, the observed discount ()
will shrink below the underlying 0 as modeled by (4). Then, (4) and (5) should be
remodeled as:
 = 0 + 11 + 22 +  + 0 (8)
∗ = 1+ 2 + 31 +  (9)
 in (4) becomes  + 0 in (8), where  represents the shrinkage from the anticipation eﬀect, i.e.,
 is expected to be negative. As a result, we have
 = ( ) = ( + 0 ) = 2 (10)
 0 if   0,
hence the simultaneity of the system. Note that since   0, the endogeneity acts in the opposite
direction from the true 1 and using equation (9) alone will underestimate 1. In other words,
empiricists might estimate a low 1 simply because a low discount is observed when the market
anticipates a takeover. The only way to uncover the true 1 is by using an instrumental variable
2 that has a direct eﬀect on , but only aﬀects ∗ via its eﬀect on .
The system cannot be estimated using conventional two-stage least squares because the observed
variable  is a binary variable. Our estimation follows Rivers and Vuong (1988) and adopts
the maximum likelihood method. We estimate (9) as the main equation, using the reduced form of
(8) as an input to the main equation, and instrumenting the endogenous variable  by the
2 variable. Later, we back out the relation from  shocks to  in (8) from the
estimation (see Section 3.2) .
The intuition of the estimation is as follows. Suppose we obtain the residual discount, g,
from the linear regression as specified in (8):
g = − b0 − b11 − b22 (11)
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g is thus the empirical analog of the sum of two components: the anticipation eﬀect ()
and an unmodeled residual disturbance (0). The power of the test rests on the explanatory power
of , 1 and 2 so that, within g, the unmodeled residual 0 (which is not correlated with
any other variables in the model) does not dominate the anticipation eﬀect . The residual in
(9), , can be expressed as a linear function of g as follows:
 =  g+ 0 (12)
Substituting (12) into (9) yields:
∗ = 1+ 2 + 31 +  g+ 0| {z }
=
 (13)
By adding the projected residual, g, as a control function (or “auxiliary” regressor)
in equation (13), it absorbs the correlation between the error term and the  regressor.
Therefore, the resulting residual 0 is now a well-behaved disturbance that is uncorrelated with
all other regressors in the  equation, including . As a result, (13) resembles a
regular probit specification except that g, which is not a natural covariate, needs to be
integrated out in order to obtain coeﬃcients on observable variables. Equation (20) in Appendix
A.2 presents the full likelihood function.
2 Data and Variable Description
2.1 Data
We obtain data on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) from Securities Data Company (SDC), for
1980-2007. Since we are assuming a suﬃcient change-of-control that the acquirer is able to improve
the target’s eﬃciency, we use SDC’s “Form of the Deal” variable to exclude transactions classified
as acquisitions of partial stakes, minority squeeze-outs, buybacks, recapitalizations, and exchange
oﬀers. We also delete transactions where the bidder had a stake exceeding 50% before the acquisi-
tion, or a final holding of under 50%. This leaves us with 13,196 deals. As we require the target’s
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valuation, we drop all transactions for which the target does not have stock return data on CRSP
and basic accounting data from Compustat. We also exclude all financial (SIC code 6000-6999)
and utilities (SIC code 4000-4949) firms from the sample, because takeovers are highly regulated
in these industries. These restrictions bring the final sample down to 6,555 deals. From this list we
construct the variable , a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm receives a takeover bid
in a particular calendar year. The universe of potential targets is all non-financial and non-utility
firms that have the necessary CRSP and Compustat data.
Table 1, Panel A provides a full definition of all the independent variables used in our analysis;
summary statistics are in Panel B. All of our accounting variables are obtained from Compustat;
we obtain additional variables from CRSP, Thomson Reuters, and SDC as detailed below. All
variables from Compustat are calculated for the fiscal year ending the year before the 
dummy; the others are calculated for the prior calendar year. All potentially unbounded numbers
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
[Insert Table 1 here]
2.2 Variable Description
The construction of the  variable relies on the choice of a valuation metric to determine
 and a set of fundamental variables that can be used to predict the frontier value. Our primary
valuation measure is , the ratio of enterprise value (debt plus market equity) to book value (debt
plus book equity), as it is the most widely used valuation metric in the finance literature. We also
use a secondary measure, , the ratio of enterprise value to earnings before interest, tax,
depreciation and amortization, because most takeovers are driven by the acquirer’s desire to access
the target cash flows rather than liquidate target assets. In addition, this variable is frequently
used by M&A practitioners. Negative values for these observations are coded as missing.
The rationale behind the choice of  variables was described in Section 1.1. In our first
specification, the only  variable is a firm’s industry aﬃliation as classified by the SIC three-
digit code. Therefore, the frontier value is the 80th percentile valuation of a given industry. To
construct this measure, we first pool observations from all years for a given industry, filter out year
fixed eﬀects from the valuation measures, retrieve the 80th percentile value, and then add back the
16
year fixed eﬀects.9 Finally, we calculate  as in (3), i.e. it is the shortfall of actual from
potential valuation, scaled by the latter.
In the second specification, we use firm-specific characteristics that are unlikely to be substan-
tially changed by the acquirer. We first include , the firm’s age (defined as the number of
years since a firm’s first appearance in CRSP), as this is a characteristic that an acquirer cannot
change. Given potential non-linearities (the eﬀect of  on growth opportunities and thus firm
value is likely to be greatest for young firms), we also include the square of . We use  (in
ranks) as a measure of firm size, which likely impacts the frontier valuation as it proxies for growth
opportunities and diminishing returns to scale.10 Size is primarily determined by factors outside
the acquirer’s control such as firm history.  (3-year sales growth) and  (market
share in the SIC 3-digit industry) are likely to be positively correlated with valuation and are also
a function of firm history. & (the ratio of R&D to sales) may aﬀect valuation as it is correlated
with growth opportunities, and  (the firm’s unlevered market beta) captures business
cyclicality which aﬀects the cost of capital. Both are aﬀected by a firm’s industry, which is unlikely
to be changed by the acquirer. We also employ  (asset turnover, the ratio of sales to total
assets), as this is primarily determined by the asset intensity or the importance of tangible assets
in the firm’s industry. A high proportion of intangible assets is likely to be associated with a low
book value and thus a high .
As stated previously, since an acquirer can alter these  variables to a degree, we only use
their tercile ranks among all Compustat firms in a given year (except for , where we use the
continuous variable as it is strictly exogenous). Our methodology thus allows companies to change
the fundamentals within tercile ranges, but not significantly enough to transform the firm into a
diﬀerent tercile. For example, an acquirer of a retail company is unlikely to increase R&D in the
target company to the level of pharmaceutical companies, and vice versa. We estimate the frontier
values based on firm-specific characteristics using the censored quantile regression technique as
specified in (1) and (2), and construct  accordingly.
9We pool observations from all years for a given industry (while adjusting for year fixed eﬀects) in order to have a
large sample to form accurate percentile estimates. On average, there are 26 observations in an industry-year, and
693 observations in an industry across all years from 1980-2006.
10We use  rather than market capitalization as our measure of size, since the latter is correlated with our
dependent variables.
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The combination of two valuation metrics and two frontier value specifications yields four
 measures. Their summary statistics are reported in Table 1, Panel B. The 20th per-
centile values are close to zero by construction, and the mean is 18− 28%.11 In addition to being
necessary to estimate the trigger eﬀect, the “underlying” discount is of independent interest as it
measures the potential increase in social welfare from a disciplinary takeover. Figure 1 plots two
graphs. The first is the time series of the aggregate discount values using the industry frontier value
specification, where each year observation is obtained as the equal-weighted average across all firms
during that year. The second is the empirical frequency of takeovers during the sample period,
which ranges from about 3% to above 8% annually. The aggregate discount and takeover levels
tend to move in the same direction, except for 2002-2003 when the market crash both depressed
valuations and reduced firms’ ability to finance acquisitions.
[Insert Figure 1 here.]
As specified in (4), there are three sets of variables that explain the cross-sectional variation
in . The first group is the firm fundamental variables . The second group is our 1
variables, which measure firm characteristics or policies that aﬀect both the valuation discount and
also the takeover likelihood, either through proxying for managerial entrenchment (thus deterring
takeovers), or aﬀecting the ease of takeover execution.  (net debt / book assets) and
 (dividends plus repurchases divided by net income) both reduce the free cash available to
managers and therefore are likely to lessen discounts. In addition, both variables are correlated with
business maturity and thus cash flow stability, which facilitates financing of the takeover. As an
external governance measure we include 3, the Herfindahl index of all firms’ sales within
the firm’s primary 3-digit SIC, to capture the degree of product market competition and antitrust
concerns which may impede acquisition.12 We also construct the Herfindahl index of the firm’s sales
by business segment, , as a measure of diversification. Diversification may proxy for an
11The mean value is slightly higher than the 16% found by Habib and Ljungqvist (2005) using a diﬀerent (paramet-
ric) methodology and a larger set of  variables. As we discuss in the text, we are intentionally being stringent on
the criteria for  variables, to ensure that the determinants of the frontier are largely beyond the control of managers
and potential acquirers.
12 Industry concentration could also be a fundamental variable, as industry competitiveness can aﬀect firm prof-
itability. We follow Habib and Ljungqvist (2005) and include it in the category of agency variables. Giroud and
Mueller (2010) show that product market competition can discipline management and render corporate governance
unimportant.
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empire-building manager and thus increase the discount; it may also directly deter takeovers since
it complicates target integration. Institutional shareholder monitoring is an internal governance
mechanism that is likely associated with a lower discount. In addition, institutional ownership
concentration also facilitates coordination among shareholders, thus reducing the Grossman and
Hart (1980) free-rider problem in takeovers. Indeed, Mikkelson and Partch (1989) and Shivdasani
(1993) find that block ownership increases the probability of a takeover attempt. We construct
 to be the total percentage ownership by institutions from Thomson Reuters.13 We also add
, the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure. Although not a measure of agency costs, we
classify it as a 1 variable as it impacts both  and . Illiquidity directly aﬀects
takeover likelihood as it deters toehold accumulation, which in turn aﬀects takeover success rates
(Betton and Eckbo (2000)). In addition, it causes firms to trade at a discount (Amihud (2002)).
Finally, the 2 variable aﬀects , but has no eﬀect on takeover probability other than
through its impact on the discount. We therefore seek a variable that aﬀects the price due to market
frictions and is unrelated to firm fundamentals and managerial resistance. Our chosen instrument is
, the price pressure created by mutual fund trading, which is not induced by information,
but rather by investor flows. Appendix A.1 describes the construction of this variable in detail.
We assume that following investor outflows (inflows), a mutual fund will be pressured to sell (buy)
shares in proportion to its current holdings. Hence, for each stock, this measure is the hypothetical
net buying by all mutual funds in response to net flows in each period. Since order imbalances aﬀect
stock prices (see, e.g. Sias, Starks, and Titman (2006) and Coval and Staﬀord (2007)), 
is negatively correlated with .
An important feature of our  measure is that it is constructed not using mutual
funds’ actual purchases and sales (as in Sias, Starks, and Titman (2006) and Coval and Staﬀord
13We do not use the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) shareholder rights measure or the Bebchuk, Cohen, and
Ferrell (2009) entrenchment index as additional corporate governance variables as they substantially reduce our sample
size, and skew the sample towards large firms. Since large firms are less likely to be taken over, the sample becomes
unrepresentative of the universe of takeover targets. Panel A of Table IA1 in the Internet Appendix shows that, in
the subsamples in which they are available, the entrenchment index is uncorrelated with takeover probability. The
shareholder rights index is uncorrelated with the takeover probability using the  valuation measure. While
it is positively correlated with takeover probability using the  measure,  retains its significance. Panel
B shows that both indices are positively correlated with , suggesting that worse governed firms command
lower valuations, consistent with Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). Bates,
Becher, and Lemmon (2008) also find that the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) antitakeover measures do not
reduce the likelihood of takeover (and in some cases are positively correlated with takeover probability.)
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(2007)), but using hypothetical orders projected from their previously disclosed portfolio. There-
fore,  does not reflect mutual funds’ discretionary trades possibly based on changes in
their views of a stock’s takeover vulnerability. Rather, this measure captures the expansion or
contraction of a fund’s existing positions that is mechanically induced by investor inflows to and
outflows from the fund. Such flows are in turn unlikely to be driven by investors’ views on the
takeover likelihood of an individual firm held by the fund, since these views would be expressed
through direct trading of the stock. Hence, satisfies the econometric requirement of being
correlated with the discount, but not directly with the probability of a takeover.
A potential concern is that some funds’ prior holdings may reflect stock pickings that successfully
anticipate future takeovers, and that investors’ decisions on outflows and inflows are aﬀected by
this. Any such eﬀect should, however, attenuate our findings. Funds skilled in identifying takeover
targets should attract inflows due to their superior performance. Such inflows will inflate the price
of the firms in their portfolio (which may have been selected by the fund owing to their underlying
takeover vulnerability) and reduce their likelihood of acquisition. Separately, it is possible that
mutual funds specializing in a particular industry experience flows that are correlated with shocks
to both the valuation and takeover activities in the industry. For example, the bursting of the
technology bubble sparked both sector consolidation and outflows from technology mutual funds.
To mitigate this concern, we exclude these sector mutual funds in constructing the 
measure.14 In addition, we use year fixed eﬀects to control for any aggregate shocks to both
takeover activity and fund flows in a particular year.
Figure 2 illustrates the magnitude and persistence of the stock price eﬀect of mechanically-
driven mutual fund redemptions. Following Coval and Staﬀord (2007), we define an “event” as a
firm-month where  falls below the 10th percentile value of the full sample. We then trace
out the cumulative average abnormal returns () over the CRSP equal-weighted index from
12 months before the event to 24 months after. (There are three event months because holdings are
only recorded at the quarterly level, while returns are recorded at a monthly frequency). Figure 2
shows that the price pressure eﬀects are both significant in magnitude and long-lasting, persisting
for over a year. Equally importantly, they are temporary rather than fundamental, with the price
14These funds represent 85% of all funds in our sample, and 87% of the aggregate flows (in unsigned absolute
magnitude) to and from equity mutual funds. Results are unchanged when including these funds.
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recovering by the end of the 24th month. This is a similar duration eﬀect to that found by Coval
and Staﬀord (2007).
[Insert Figure 2 here.]
3 Empirical Results
3.1 Determinants of Discount and Takeover Without Feedback
As a first step and for comparison with later results, we estimate (4) and (5) without incorporating
the anticipation eﬀect. In this setting, the two equations are estimated separately. Table 2 reports
the determinants of  and , for all four measures of .
[Insert Table 2 here.]
We describe first the results in Panel B, which tabulates the determinants of . Both
high leverage and high payout should mitigate the agency problem of free cash flow and reduce
the discount. Our empirical results are consistent with this hypothesis for , although the
results for  are more mixed. Firms with more concentrated businesses (high) are
associated with a lower discount, consistent with the large literature on the diversification discount.
Industry concentration (proxied by 3) has a negative eﬀect on , indicating that
the benefits from market power outweigh the lack of product market discipline. Some variables,
such as , have diﬀerent eﬀects on  depending on whether the frontier is industry- or
firm-specific. This dichotomy implies that stocks with high institutional ownership tend to have
high valuations relative to their fundamental variables, but low valuations relative to other firms in
the same industry. Finally, consistent with Amihud (2002), illiquidity increases the discount. Our
instrument, , is significantly associated with lower discounts across all four specifications.
We now turn to the  equation in Panel A, which illustrates the responsiveness of the
probability of acquisition to . In terms of marginal probabilities, a one percentage point
increase in  is associated with a 1 − 3 basis point (i.e. a 0.01-0.03 percentage point)
increase in takeover probability, and an inter-quartile change in  is associated with a
04 − 16 percentage point increase, out of an unconditional probability of 62 percent. While a
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number of prior papers found no relationship between takeovers and raw valuation, this coeﬃcient
is highly statistically significant. The result is consistent with the hypothesis that the discount to
potential value, rather than raw valuation, motivates acquisitions.15 Nevertheless, the economic
magnitude is modest, especially when using . This is because the observed discount is
shrunk by the prospects of a takeover. Such an anticipation eﬀect attenuates the relation between
takeover and valuation. The next section shows that, when feedback is controlled for, the economic
significance rises substantially.
3.2 Determinants of Takeover and Discount With Feedback
3.2.1 The Trigger Eﬀect
We now analyze the simultaneous system of (8) and (9). We first investigate the eﬀect of the
underlying discount, 0, on takeover probability that would prevail if the former did not
anticipate the latter, i.e. we estimate the trigger eﬀect, controlling for the anticipation eﬀect. It
therefore measures the “true” importance of the discount for takeover attractiveness. The results
are reported in Table 3.
[Insert Table 3 here.]
Compared to estimates in Table 2, the coeﬃcients on  are orders of magnitude higher
in all four specifications. Table 3 shows that a one percentage point increase in  would
lead to a statistically significant 12 − 16 basis point increase in  probability if 
did not shrink in anticipation of a takeover. An inter-quartile change in  is associated with
a 57−76 percentage point increase in  probability, economically significant compared to
an unconditional probability of 62 percent. The sensitivity is higher using the  measure
derived from industry-specific value frontiers, indicating that acquirers are more attracted to firms
with low valuations compared to their industry peers.
The table also presents the results of two Wald tests. The first is a Stock and Yogo (2005) weak
instrument test, which rejects the hypothesis that the instruments are weak. The second evaluates
15Replacing  with raw valuation leads to an inter-quartile response of 004 (using ) and 065
(using ) percentage points in takeover frequency. Both values, though significant in our large sample, are consid-
erably lower than those using . This economically insignificant coeﬃcient is consistent with prior empirical
findings.
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the exogeneity of the system, i.e. whether  is exogenous to shocks in . The null
is rejected at less than the 1% level in all four specifications. The second test result, combined with
the diﬀerence in the  coeﬃcient between Tables 2 and 3, highlights the need to control
for the anticipation eﬀect when estimating the trigger eﬀect. Doing so shows that prices are a far
more important driver of takeover activities than implied by the equilibrium correlation between
the two variables.
3.2.2 The Anticipation Eﬀect
While Table 3 quantifies the trigger eﬀect, we now tackle the reverse question of estimating the
anticipation eﬀect — how much the discount shrinks due to the market’s anticipation of likely
takeovers. Put diﬀerently, we wish to measure the “overvaluation” relative to current fundamentals,
agency costs and market frictions that is caused by takeover expectations.
Empirically, one way to quantify the anticipation component in  is to estimate the
eﬀect of takeover vulnerability (i.e., ∗) on , controlling for other determinants.
Identification of such an eﬀect would require an instrumental variable that impacts ∗ but
does not aﬀect  directly. We are not able to find firm-specific variables that satisfy this
exclusion restriction. Valid instruments could come from the “supply side,” such as capital inflows
to buyout funds or interest rates that proxy for the ease of financing. However, such instruments
suﬀer from low power because they fail to generate variation in the cross-section.
We therefore adopt a diﬀerent approach. We identify the eﬀect of the shocks to takeover
vulnerability (i.e., the  term in equation (8)) on  by utilizing the intermediate and final
outputs from estimating equation (9). The anticipation coeﬃcient  is a linear projection of the
residual discount (defined in (11)) on , the residual in the takeover equation. We can therefore
construct a b estimate by regressing the empirical analog of residual discount ( g) on the
empirical analog of  (b). The empirical analog g is readily available from (11). For the
empirical analog b, we adopt the “generalized residual” for discrete response models as proposed
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by Gourieroux, Monfort, Renault, and Trognon (1987):
b =
h
 −cPr ()icPr0 ()cPr () h1−cPr ()i 
wherecPr () andcPr0 () represent the estimated probability and density (derivative
of probability) of , respectively. Assuming that error disturbances are drawn from normal
distributions, the above expression becomes
b = [ −Φ (b)] (b)Φ (b) [1−Φ (b)]  (14)
where b = b1+ b2 + b31
where Φ and  represent the cumulative distribution function and the density function of the
standard normal distribution, respectively.
The results from all four specifications are reported in Table 4. Our estimates for the anticipation
coeﬃcient  are uniformly negative and highly statistically significant. The economic magnitude of
the coeﬃcients is not readily interpretable because  is a shock to the propensity of takeover which
does not have a natural unit. However, we can calculate the estimated discount shrinkage due to
a one standard deviation change in the takeover propensity. These calibrated marginal eﬀects are
reported below the coeﬃcients in Table 4.
[Insert Table 4 here.]
Table 4 indicates that if a firm’s takeover likelihood rises, exogenously, from the 25th to the
75th percentile value,  shrinks by an average of 39 percentage points. Such a magnitude
is economically plausible and significant given the average discount level of 18%− 28%.
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4 Additional Analyses
4.1 Discount, Takeover Premium, and Acquirer Return
In equilibrium, we would expect our discount measure to be positively correlated with the premium
paid to the target, as well as with the acquirer return. A higher discount implies greater gains from
a corrective takeover. Thus, as long as the target has some bargaining power, it should capture a
proportion of these gains in the form of a higher premium. Similarly, as long as the acquirer has
some bargaining power, it should also realize a higher gain when the discount is higher.
As is standard in the literature, we calculate  as the percentage increase in the target’s
stock price over the [−60 0] window relative to the announcement date,16 and  as
the [−1+1] percentage increase in the acquirer’s stock price. We find that both are positively and
significantly correlated with : averaging across all four  measures, the correlation
coeﬃcients are 72% and 18%, respectively. By the same logic, a measure of total return from the
acquisition ( = + ) should also be positively correlated with the
discount. Indeed, the average correlation coeﬃcient is 74%.
To further explore the relation between  and the three measures of acquisition return,
we run regressions of these measures on , controlling for other determinants of these
measures. The regressions appear in Table IA2 in the Internet Appendix. The relationship between
 and both  and  retains its significance in all specifications after
the addition of controls. Importantly, while the relationship between  and 
remains highly significant, it is still far from one. This suggests that the acquirer does indeed
enjoy part of the gains from buying a discounted target, and is thus consistent with our main
result that acquirers are more likely to target discounted firms. The relationship between 
and  remains significant in the  specifications. In the  regressions, the
association is positive but not statistically significant, perhaps because measures of acquirer return
are known in the literature to be noisy.17
16The results are qualitatively similar using alternative windows (such as [−40 0]) or using the actual premium
paid. The latter is available on a smaller subsample as transaction terms are often missing.
17There are a number of challenges with measuring acquirer returns accurately. First, there is significant long-
run drift after an M&A announcement (Agrawal, Jaﬀe, and Mandelker (1992)). This means that the event-study
reactions capture only a small proportion of the overall eﬀect and leads to substantial attenuation. Moreover, the
drift in M&A is more problematic than for other corporate events, as it has no discernible relation to the initial
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4.2 Financially-Driven Takeovers
The results thus far have documented that takeovers in general are driven by low target valuations.
However, certain acquisitions are motivated by other factors, such as synergies or empire building.
As such, the trigger eﬀect should be stronger among takeovers that are particularly likely to be
valuation-driven. We classify these “financially-driven takeovers” as acquisitions that are either
leveraged buyouts or undertaken by financial sponsors. Such acquisitions are typically motivated
by underperforming current management or market undervaluation, both of which manifest them-
selves in low market prices. There are a number of reasons for these diﬀerent motives. First, the
aforementioned synergy and empire-building motives for standard acquisitions do not exist to the
same degree for LBOs: targets typically remain standalone, and LBO managers are compensated
by carried interest above a threshold rate of return. By contrast, for regular corporations, Bebchuk
and Grinstein (2009) find a significant link between firm expansion and CEO pay. Second, the
LBO structure was designed precisely to correct agency problems. The high debt (compared to
standard M&A deals) imposes discipline on the manager by forcing him to disgorge excess cash,
and concentrates his equity stake to provide incentives (see, e.g., Jensen (1989) and Jensen (1993)).
Third, the literature summarized on p9 systematically finds that LBO gains arise from correcting
underperformance.
We repeat the trigger eﬀect analysis of Table 3 removing all non-financially-driven takeovers
from the sample and report the results in Table 5, Panel A. Indeed, the eﬀect of  becomes
stronger relative to the smaller unconditional probability. An inter-quartile change in 
is associated with a 22% increase in the probability of a financially-driven takeover. The full-
sample probability of such a takeover is 13%, compared to the 62% probability of any takeover.
In addition, we repeat the anticipation eﬀect analysis of Table 4 and report the results in Table 5,
Panel B. An inter-quartile change in shocks to takeover probability leads to a 41 percentage point
shrinkage in the discount.
event-study reaction. Second, the M&A announcement only reflects the value creation that was unanticipated by the
market. A deal could destroy substantial value but only have a mild reaction because the market expected the firm
to make a value-destructive deal, e.g. because it was sitting on a pile of cash. Third, the M&A announcement return
implicitly assumes that the counterfactual if the deal had not been undertaken is zero (Prabhala (1997) and Li and
Prabhala (2007)), which may not be the case. For example, the counterfactual return could be negative because the
stock was overvalued, or the acquirer not buying the target would have allowed a rival to do so.
26
[Insert Table 5 here.]
4.3 Robustness Checks
In this section, we report results from further robustness checks. First, we check the sensitivity
of our results to the choice of  = 020 as our default percentile for frontier values. As discussed
earlier, such a choice reflects the trade-oﬀ between reducing the influence of outliers and not un-
derestimating potential values. Higher  values are associated with lower aggregate values of
. Table IA3 of the Internet Appendix indicates that the correlation of  esti-
mates based on diﬀerent quantile restrictions around  = 020 (our default value) is extremely high
(above 089). Since our analysis is driven by the relative ranking (rather than the absolute level)
of , it is not surprising then that our results for various  values in the range of [01 03]
are similar to those reported in Tables 2-4. These results are available upon request.
Second, we estimated the firm-specific frontier using tercile ranks rather than raw measures of
the  variables, to allow for bidders to change these variables within a given tercile. However, for
firms already close to the tercile cutoﬀs, it is easier for bidders to move them into a diﬀerent tercile.
We therefore rerun the analyses excluding firms within 2.5% in ranking from any tercile thresholds.
Table IA4 of the Internet Appendix shows that the results are just as strong as in the full sample
in Table 3, with an inter-quartile response of 60 − 78% compared to an unconditional takeover
probability of around 6% for this subsample. A related concern is that, in merger waves (which
may be driven by regulatory changes), fundamentals may be particularly likely to change. Table
IA5 of the Internet Appendix removes both aggregate merger waves (in Panel A) and industry
merger waves (in Panel B) and finds that the results are little changed.
Finally, our analysis focuses on bids announced rather than completed, since the target’s val-
uation is likely to have greatest eﬀect on an acquirer’s decision to bid. Whether the takeover is
subsequently completed often depends on factors unrelated to valuation, e.g. antitrust concerns.
Nevertheless, we have re-run the data defining takeover as completed deals (which is 765% of deals
in our sample) and tabulate the equivalent of Table 3 in Table IA6 of the Internet Appendix. The
results are qualitatively similar.
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5 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence on the real eﬀect of financial markets. Using non-fundamental shocks
to market prices — occurring due to non-discretionary trades by mutual funds who face liquidation
pressure from investors’ outflows — as an instrumental variable, we show that market prices aﬀect
takeover activity. A non-fundamental decrease in the stock price creates a profit opportunity for
acquirers, and increases the probability that the firm will be taken over. Using an instrument
for price changes is necessary for identifying this eﬀect since market prices are endogenous and
reflect the likelihood of an upcoming acquisition. This may explain the weak relationship between
prices and takeover activity found by prior literature. By modeling the relationship between prices
and takeovers as a simultaneous system that accounts for anticipation, and identifying using an
instrument, we find a significantly stronger eﬀect of prices on takeovers than previous research.
Our findings have a number of implications for the takeover market. They imply a double-edged
sword for the disciplinary eﬀect of takeover threat. The trigger eﬀect suggests that managerial
underperformance increases takeover vulnerability to a much greater extent than previously docu-
mented. However, the anticipation eﬀect reduces the sensitivity of takeovers to a firm’s underlying
ineﬃciency. More generally, the importance of market prices suggests that they are not simply a
side-show but aﬀect real economic activity: temporary mispricing can have real consequences by
impacting takeover probability.
While our paper identifies that market prices have an eﬀect on takeover probability, it is silent
on the mechanism behind this eﬀect. It is plausible that market prices have an eﬀect because
agents try to learn from them, and as a result rely on them when making various decisions. In
the context of takeovers, a possible mechanism is that target shareholders use the market price to
update their view about the value of the firm. Hence, they demand a price that is related to the
market price. Then, acquirers, who know more about the potential value under their management,
identify a profit opportunity when the price goes down, and are more likely to launch a bid for the
firm. Interestingly, traditional takeover theories do not incorporate such asymmetric information
and learning from prices. In a framework with symmetric information, if there is free-riding by
target shareholders (as in Grossman and Hart (1980)), the bidder must pay the potential value
 ∗ regardless of the current price, because target shareholders have full bargaining power. Even
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if the bidder has some bargaining power, it should bargain with the target over the underlying
0, rather than the observed , since it is the former that represents the potential
fundamental value that can be created. Regardless of the source of a high market valuation, it
has no eﬀect on takeover likelihood if viewed symmetrically by the bidder and the target. If high
valuation is due to positive news about fundamentals (as in Schwert (1996)), both the bidder and
target will agree that a higher takeover price is warranted. Since the superior fundamentals also
increase the target’s value to the acquirer, the bidder is fully willing to pay the higher price and
so the target’s attractiveness is unchanged. If high valuation is instead due to mispricing, both the
bidder and target will agree that it should not lead to a high takeover price, and so again takeover
likelihood is unaﬀected. Our findings thus suggest the need for new takeover theories to explain
why market prices should impact acquisition likelihood.
There are many other settings in which the interaction between the financial market and the
real economy is important. These include the impact of market prices on investment decisions,
CEO replacement, and other real activities. It is typically diﬃcult to identify a real eﬀect of the
financial market, since even if there is correlation between prices and real activity, it may be driven
by an omitted variable that aﬀects both. We are able to identify the active role of the financial
market by exploring the eﬀects of non-fundamental changes in the price which are not directly
correlated with real activity. This insight can be used to explore the empirical relation between
financial markets and real activities in these other settings.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data
This section details the calculation of the mutual fund price pressure variable. We obtain quarterly
data on mutual fund holdings from CDA Spectrum / Thomson and mutual fund flows from CRSP.
We remove funds that specialize in a single industry, and calculate
 = −−1
where  (= 1 ) indexes mutual funds, and  represents one quarter.  is the total inflow
experienced by find  in quarter , and −1 is fund ’s total assets at the end of the previous
quarter. We then construct
 =
P
=1
−1
  
for each stock-quarter pair, where  (= 1  ) indexes stocks, and the summation is only over
funds  for which  ≥ 5%.   is total dollar trading volume of stock  in quarter ,
and
 =  × −1
is the dollar value of fund ’s holdings of stock , as a proportion of fund ’s total assets at the end
of the previous quarter. Substitution gives our mutual fund price pressure measure as
 =
P
=1
 × −1 × −1
−1 ×   
where the summation is only over funds  for which  ≥ 5%.
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A.2 Estimation Procedures
This section derives the FIML likelihood function for equation (9). The likelihood of an individual
takeover in our simultaneous equation model is as follows, omitting the   subscripts for brevity:
 = ( = 1)( = 0)1−
where the joint density function  is
( = 1) =
Z ∞
−1−2−31
 ( )  (18)
and
( = 0) =
Z −1−2−31
−∞
 ( )  (19)
where  ( ) is the bivariate density function (assumed to be normal for estimation purposes), and
can be expressed as the product of a conditional distribution and a marginal distribution:
 ( ) =  (|) ()
The conditional distribution  (|) is normal with mean  and variance 1 − 2, where 
and  are the standard notations for correlation coeﬃcient and standard deviation. Therefore the
joint density function of (18), assuming all variables are jointly normal, can be rewritten as
( = 1) = Φ
⎛
⎝1+ 2 + 31 + q
1− 2
⎞
⎠
µ 

¶

and Φ,  are the cumulative probability and density functions of the standard normal distribution.
Equation (19) can be rewritten analogously. Combining all equations, we arrive at the log likelihood
for a takeover on a firm-year observation:
 =  ln [Φ (−1)] + (1− ) ln [1−Φ (−1)]− ln()− 
2
22  (20)
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where
 = 1+ 2 + 31 + q
1− 2

 = − 11 − 22
The estimation methodology is FIML. It is “full information” because it employs the full in-
formation about the joint distribution of ( ), by using the conditional distribution (|) and
the marginal distribution () simultaneously. Second, it is a “maximum likelihood” estimator
and thus provides the most eﬃcient estimates (i.e., attains the Cramer-Rao bound) as long as the
model is correctly specified.
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Figure 1. Time Series of Aggregate Discounts and Takeover Activities 
This figure plots the time series (1980-2006) of the aggregate Discount (the left axis), and the empirical 
frequency of takeovers (the right axis).   
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Figure 2.  Effect of Mutual Fund Outflows on Stock Returns 
This figure plots the monthly cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of stocks around the event 
months, where an event is defined as a firm-month observation where MFFlow falls below the 10th percentile 
value of the full sample.  CAAR is computed over the benchmark of the CRSP equal-weighted index from 12 
months before the event to 24 months after.  (There are three event months because holdings are only recorded at 
the quarterly level, while returns are recorded at a monthly frequency). 
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Table 1.  Summary of Variables 
 
This table summarizes the main variables used. All data are obtained from Compustat unless otherwise stated. "data" numbers refer to the line 
items from Compustat. 
Panel A:  Data Definitions 
  Definition 
Discount Variables (Discount) 
Discount (Industry: EV/Ebitda) Value discount relative to industry frontier, using EV/Ebitda as the valuation metric 
Discount (Industry: Q) Value discount relative to industry frontier, using Q as the valuation metric 
Discount (Firm: EV/Ebitda) Value discount relative to firm-specific frontier, using EV/Ebitda as the valuation metric 
Discount (Firm: Q) Value discount relative to firm-specific frontier, using EV/Ebitda as the valuation metric 
Fundamental Variables (X) 
Age Firm age, calculated as years from first appearance in CRSP 
ATO Asset turnover. Sales (data12) / Assets (data6) 
BetaAsset Beta on the market factor in a Fama-French three-factor model using daily data from CRSP, and then unlevered 
Growth Average sales growth during past (up to) three years 
MktShr Sales / Total sales in SIC 3-digit industry 
R&D R&D expense (data46) / Sales (data12).  Zero if missing 
SalesRank Rank of sales (data12) among all Compustat firms in a given year, ranging from 0 to 1 
Variables Affecting Discount and Takeover Probability (Z₁) 
Amihud Illiquidity measure per Amihud (2002). Yearly average of the square root of (Price×Vol)/|Return| 
Daily observations with a zero return are removed. Coded as missing if < 30 observations in a year.  From CRSP 
HHIFirm Herfindahl index of firm's sales in different business segments 
HHISIC3 Herfindahl index of sales by all firms in SIC 3-digit industry 
Inst % of shares outstanding held by institutions. From Thomson Financial 
Leverage (Debt (data9 + data34) - Cash (data1)) / Assets 
Payout (Dividends (data21) + Repurchases (data115)) / Net Income (data18). 0 if numerator is zero or missing;  
  1 if numerator > 0 and denominator = 0 
Variables Affecting Discount (Z₂) 
MFFlow Mutual fund price pressure. From Thomson Reuters mutual fund holdings database. See Appendix A for further details 
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Panel B:  Summary Statistics 
Name # obs Mean Std. Dev. Percentiles 
        5th 25th 50th 75th 95th 
Age 118,942 11.48 13.03 1 3 7 15 37 
ATO 118,942 1.21 0.82 0.17 0.63 1.08 1.59 2.79 
Amihud 101,026 0.77 1.11 0.02 0.11 0.35 0.93 3.05 
BetaAssets 117,211 0.69 0.41 0.09 0.38 0.65 0.95 1.45 
Discount (Industry: EV/Ebitda) 92,116 0.18 0.48 -1.05 0.10 0.38 0.57 0.76 
Discount (Industry: Q) 116,543 0.24 0.47 -0.90 0.09 0.37 0.57 0.77 
Discount (Firm: EV/Ebitda) 92,141 0.27 0.48 -1.03 0.11 0.41 0.61 0.79 
Discount (Firm: Q) 116,567 0.28 0.46 -0.92 0.11 0.41 0.60 0.77 
EV/Ebitda 92,141 15.95 28.05 3.76 6.12 8.70 13.77 47.05 
Growth (%) 118,942 30.4% 80.0% -17.8% 1.3% 11.4% 28.3% 127.5% 
HHIFirm 118,942 0.85 0.24 0.35 0.66 1.00 1.00 1.00 
HHISIC3 118,942 0.19 0.16 0.06 0.09 0.14 0.25 0.50 
Inst (%) 118,942 27.9% 26.7% 0.0% 4.1% 19.8% 46.8% 80.4% 
Leverage (%) 118,942 8.8% 34.6% -56.5% -11.7% 12.5% 31.8% 60.5% 
MFFlow 118,942 -0.30 0.92 -1.45 -0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MktShr (%) 118,942 5.1% 12.8% 0.0% 0.1% 0.5% 3.3% 27.4% 
Payout (%) 118,942 38.1% 77.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.3% 137.0% 
Q 116,567 2.33 2.55 0.67 1.04 1.51 2.51 6.75 
R&D (%) 118,942 19.0% 114.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.7% 38.2% 
Sales (Log) 118,942 4.68 2.38 0.69 3.13 4.68 6.27 8.66 
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Table 2.  Determinants of Discount and Takeover without Feedback 
 
This table reports the results from estimating equations (4) and (5) separately.  All variables are defined in Table 1.  The dependent variable in 
Panel A is Takeover, and that in Panel B is Discount.  In the regressions with industry-specific frontiers, all non-dummy regressors are industry-adjusted. 
The firm-specific frontier is formed by a quantile (at the 80th percentile) regression of valuation measures on SalesRank, R&D, ATO, MktShr, Growth, 
BetaAsset (all expressed in tercile ranks), Age and Age2. Year fixed effects are used in all specifications, but unreported. All standard errors are adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity and within-cluster correlation. In Panel A, they are clustered at the firm level; in Panel B, they are double-clustered at the year and 
the firm level.  The column dPr/dX gives the marginal effect on takeover probability of a one unit (or 100 percentage points) change in each regressor.  
The bottom row of the table reports the number of observations, the pseudo R2, and the all-sample frequency of the dependent variable being one. *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
Panel A:  Determinants of Takeover 
  Dependent Variable = Takeover 
Discount = Discount(Q) Discount = Discount(EV/Ebitda) 
Industry-Specific Frontier Firm-Specific Frontier Industry-Specific Frontier Firm-Specific Frontier 
  Coef t-stat dPr/dX Coef t-stat dPr/dX  Coef t-stat dPr/dX Coef t-stat dPr/dX 
Discount 0.282*** 15.34 3.28% 0.128*** 7.99 1.51% 0.116*** 6.66 1.37% 0.070*** 4.30 0.84% 
  (effect of inter-quartile change) 1.58% 0.74% 0.65% 0.41% 
SalesRank 0.065 1.42 0.76% 0.114** 2.51 1.35% -0.065 -1.21 -0.76% -0.022 -0.42 -0.26% 
R&D -0.020*** -2.71 -0.23% -0.018** -2.51 -0.21% 0.145 1.15 1.71% 0.158 1.26 1.86% 
ATO 0.023** 2.44 0.27% 0.014 1.47 0.16% -0.005 -0.42 -0.05% 0.003 0.26 0.03% 
MktShr -0.233*** -3.19 -2.71% -0.273*** -3.70 -3.22% -0.275*** -3.59 -3.24% -0.279*** -3.63 -3.29% 
Growth 0.004 0.47 -0.05% -0.007 -0.80 -0.08% -0.004 -0.29 -0.05% -0.007 -0.51 -0.08% 
BetaAsset -0.054*** -2.78 -0.63% -0.123*** -6.40 -1.45% -0.112*** -4.98 -1.31% -0.121*** -5.38 -1.43% 
Leverage 0.030 1.23 0.35% 0.012 0.51 0.14% 0.112*** 3.65 1.32% 0.105*** 3.44 1.24% 
Payout -0.000 -0.01 -0.00% 0.004 0.47 0.05% 0.006 0.67 0.07% 0.005 0.55 0.06% 
HHIFirm 0.230*** 7.19 2.67% 0.233*** 7.28 2.75% 0.175*** 5.13 2.06% 0.180*** 5.26 2.12% 
Inst 0.100*** 2.53 1.16% 0.090** 2.28 1.06% 0.069 1.61 0.82% 0.077* 1.79 0.91% 
HHISIC3 -0.082 -1.53 -0.95% -0.091* -1.71 -1.07% -0.063 -1.03 -0.74% -0.072 -1.19 -0.85% 
Amihud -0.034*** -4.05 -0.39% -0.023*** -2.84 -0.27% -0.027*** -2.62 -0.32% -0.026** -2.54 -0.31% 
# obs, pseudo- R2, and 
all-sample frequency 100,160 0.019 6.18% 100,166 0.015 6.18%  79,100 0.018 6.24% 79,103 0.017 6.24% 
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Panel B:  Determinants of Discount 
Discount Discount(Q) Discount(EV/Ebitda) 
Frontier  Industry Firm Industry Firm 
          
Sales 0.2818*** 0.1185*** 0.3419*** -0.0840*** 
[13.34] [5.27] [15.48] [-3.77] 
R&D -0.0097*** -0.0348*** -0.7116*** -1.3508*** 
[-3.81] [-12.73] [-11.82] [-19.57] 
ATO -0.0662*** -0.0627*** 0.0441*** -0.0337*** 
[-15.84] [-14.62] [9.96] [-7.64] 
MktShr -0.2317*** -0.1519*** -0.0494* -0.0085 
[-7.42] [-4.64] [-1.82] [-0.31] 
Growth -0.0531*** -0.0258*** -0.0696*** -0.0677*** 
[-17.48] [-8.67] [-14.02] [-13.29] 
BetaAsset -0.2253*** 0.0680*** -0.0577*** 0.0364*** 
[-38.61] [11.24] [-8.26] [5.29] 
Leverage -0.0583*** 0.0141 -0.0689*** -0.0220* 
[-5.63] [1.22] [-5.39] [-1.69] 
Payout 0.0206*** 0.0107*** -0.0236*** -0.0195*** 
[9.71] [4.51] [-9.40] [-7.68] 
HHIFirm -0.0591*** -0.1401*** -0.0093 -0.0764*** 
[-4.74] [-11.64] [-0.74] [-6.32] 
Inst -0.1028*** -0.1379*** 0.0235 -0.0553*** 
[-6.41] [-8.07] [1.47] [-3.36] 
HHISIC3 -0.0759*** -0.0372* -0.1105*** -0.0579*** 
[-3.40] [-1.74] [-4.84] [-2.72] 
Amihud 0.0838*** 0.0869*** 0.0253*** 0.0261*** 
[32.84] [32.27] [6.88] [7.40] 
MFFlow -0.0139*** -0.0193*** -0.0103*** -0.0161*** 
[-8.43] [-10.13] [-4.63] [-7.13] 
Constant 0.4649*** 0.3268*** 0.1037*** 0.4618*** 
[25.72] [18.82] [4.96] [23.44] 
R-squared 0.126 0.098 0.064 0.081 
# Observations 100,160 100,166 79,100 79,103 
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Table 3.  Effects of Discount on Takeover with Feedback 
 
This table reports the results from estimating equation (9) in the (8)-(9) joint system.  All variables are defined in Table 1.  The dependent variable 
is Takeover.  In the regressions with industry-specific frontiers, all non-dummy regressors are industry-adjusted.  All standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and correlation clustered at the firm level. The column dPr/dX gives the marginal effect on takeover probability of a one unit (or 100 
percentage points) change in each regressor.  Year fixed effects are used in all specifications, but unreported.  The bottom of the table reports the number 
of observations, the pseudo R2, and the all-sample frequency of the dependent variable being one. Also reported are the test for weak instruments (which 
rejects the null that the instrumental variable is weak at any significance level higher than the indicated p-value) and the Wald test for the exogeneity of the 
system (which rejects the null that the joint system could be reduced to two independent equations at any significance level higher than the indicated p-
value).  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
  Dependent Variable = Takeover 
Discount = Discount(Q) Discount = Discount(EV/Ebitda) 
Industry-Specific Frontier Firm-Specific Frontier Industry-Specific Frontier Firm-Specific Frontier 
  Coef t-stat dPr/dX Coef t-stat dPr/dX  Coef t-stat dPr/dX Coef t-stat dPr/dX 
Discount 1.371*** 4.24 15.66% 0.989*** 3.67 11.58% 1.512*** 4.51 15.87% 1.101*** 3.64 12.64% 
  (effect of inter-quartile change) 7.55% 5.65% 7.48% 6.25% 
Sales -0.259** -2.31 -2.96% 0.002 0.02 0.02% -0.536*** -4.34 -5.62% 0.069 1.17 0.79% 
R&D -0.006 -0.73 -0.07% 0.014 1.13 0.17% 1.138*** 4.28 11.95% 1.567*** 3.61 17.90% 
ATO 0.094*** 4.09 1.07% 0.0667*** 3.51 0.78% -0.067*** -3.72 -0.70% 0.0372** 2.51 0.43% 
MktShr 0.058 0.47 0.66% -0.115 -1.23 -1.35% -0.135 -1.52 -1.42% -0.231*** -2.96 -2.64% 
Growth 0.064*** 3.19 0.73% 0.017 1.49 0.20% 0.097*** 3.00 0.53% 0.066** 2.58 0.22% 
BetaAsset 0.208** 2.47 2.37% -0.170*** -7.65 -1.99% 0.000 0.00 0.00% -0.141*** -6.66 -1.61% 
Leverage 0.094*** 3.10 1.07% 0.001 0.04 0.01% 0.187*** 6.16 1.96% 0.119*** 4.03 1.36% 
Payout 0.023** -2.16 -0.26% -0.006 -0.66 -0.07% 0.038*** 3.58 0.40% 0.025** 2.49 0.28% 
HHIFirm 0.271*** 8.53 3.10% 0.340*** 8.11 3.98% 0.148*** 3.94 1.55% 0.239*** 6.90 2.73% 
Inst 0.196*** 4.16 2.24% 0.195*** 3.87 2.28% 0.012 0.27 0.12% 0.117*** 2.74 1.33% 
HHISIC3 0.008 0.12 0.08% -0.057 -1.07 -0.67% 0.105 1.41 1.11% -0.007 -0.12 -0.09% 
Amihud -0.124*** -4.50 -1.42% -0.097*** -4.03 -1.14% -0.057*** -5.29 -0.60% -0.050*** -4.39 -0.57% 
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# obs, pseudo- R2, and 
all-sample frequency 100,160 0.020 6.18% 100,166 0.015 6.18%  79,100 0.018 6.24% 79,103 0.017 6.24% 
Weak instrument tests 
F(1, #obs) and p-val 95.38 0.00 167.15 0.00 38.00 0.00 91.39 0.00 
Exogeneity tests 
Wald (chi2 and p-val) 7.71 0.01   8.21 0.00    7.93 0.01   8.04 0.01 
 
 
 
Table 4.  The Feedback Effect from Takeover to Discount 
 
This table reports the estimation of the system (8)-(9) through a regression of residual Discount from equation (11) on shocks to Takeover from 
equation (14). Also reported are the changes in the residual Discount for one standard deviation change in the shocks to Takeover. All standard errors are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and correlation double-clustered at the year and the firm level, as well as the variation from the first-stage estimation.  *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
Residual Discount Discount(Q) Discount(EV/Ebitda) 
Frontier  Industry Firm Industry Firm 
 ξ (shocks in Takeover*) -0.163 -0.140 -0.266 -0.193 
[-32.40] [-18.66] [-32.92] [-33.96] 
(Effect of inter-quartile change) -3.08% -1.98% -7.27% -3.32% 
Observations 100,160 100,166 79,100 79,103 
R-squared 0.040 0.046 0.109 0.048 
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Table 5.  Financially-Driven Takeovers 
 
This table repeats the analyses in Table 3 (Panel A) and Table 4 (Panel B) but only studies takeovers that 
are either leveraged buyouts and/or undertaken by financial sponsors.  All other takeovers are removed from the 
sample. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
Panel A: Effect of Discount on Takeover with Feedback 
 
Discount Discount(Q) Discount(EV/Ebitda) 
Frontier  Industry Firm Industry Firm 
Discount 1.4807*** 1.4135*** 1.4710*** 1.4475*** 
[3.96] [4.06] [3.45] [3.60] 
  (dPr/dX) 4.76% 4.32% 4.69% 4.51% 
  (Effect of inter-quartile change) 2.29% 2.11% 2.21% 2.23% 
Sales -0.3762*** -0.1775* -0.5229*** 0.0188 
[-3.05] [-1.88] [-3.21] [0.24] 
R&D 0.0194* 0.0555*** 0.1000 1.0936 
[1.81] [3.65] [0.16] [1.36] 
ATO 0.1457*** 0.1352*** -0.0196 0.0953*** 
[6.28] [6.37] [-0.62] [6.26] 
MktShr 0.1870 0.0981 -0.0511 -0.0914 
[1.22] [0.74] [-0.44] [-0.83] 
Growth 0.0879*** 0.0501*** 0.0707* 0.0737* 
[3.72] [3.25] [1.67] [1.81] 
BetaAsset 0.0937 -0.3201*** -0.1183 -0.2656*** 
[0.79] [-10.43] [-1.61] [-6.58] 
Leverage 0.1410*** 0.0338 0.2136*** 0.1509*** 
[3.25] [0.82] [4.37] [3.10] 
Payout -0.0088 0.0016 0.0502*** 0.0435*** 
[-0.54] [0.12] [3.72] [3.56] 
HHIFirm 0.1260** 0.2579*** 0.0606 0.1685*** 
[2.33] [3.72] [1.24] [2.88] 
Inst 0.4694*** 0.5494*** 0.2342*** 0.4546*** 
[8.03] [8.13] [2.61] [7.23] 
HHISIC3 0.0961 -0.0309 0.1020 -0.0413 
[1.13] [-0.42] [1.03] [-0.51] 
Amihud -0.1335*** -0.1318*** -0.0306* -0.0340* 
[-4.08] [-4.23] [-1.67] [-1.88] 
Constant -2.6582*** -2.3820*** -1.9900*** -2.4652*** 
[-33.31] [-16.89] [-6.75] [-15.95] 
Probability of takeover 1.38% 1.38% 1.45% 1.45% 
Observations 94,802 94,808 74,901 74,904 
Pseudo R-squared 0.037 0.032 0.041 0.040 
Exogeneity tests 
Wald chi2 statistic 6.14 7.95 4.56 5.36 
p-value 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02 
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Panel B: The Feedback Effect from Takeover to Discount 
 
Residual Discount Discount(Q) Discount(EV/Ebitda) 
Frontier  Industry Firm Industry Firm 
 ξ (shocks in Takeover*) -0.272 -0.343 -0.375 -0.381 
-12.73 -15.39 -11.27 -12.24 
(Effect of inter-quartile change) 2.64% 3.98% 4.80% 5.02% 
Observations 94,802 94,808 74,901 74,904 
R-squared 3.59% 5.80% 6.55% 6.98% 
 
